Sodal encrypts every location update on your phone, with a key only your circle holds, before the update leaves the phone. Our server stores and forwards the result without being able to open it, so our database holds no coordinates for us to read, sell or lose. That is the short version of how we built a private location sharing app.

The longer version has exceptions, and they matter. Our server still sees who sent an update and when. The company behind your phone’s operating system can receive some coordinates when the app looks up a street name. This article covers how the system works, which features had to move onto the phone, and what we can still see.

We’re building the iPhone app first, so the technical details below describe that version. Android comes next, and we point out where Google takes Apple’s place.

The rule we started with

Location features are usually built around a server that knows where everyone is. It checks whether you’ve reached home, draws your history and works out who is nearby. That’s the easy way to build them, and it leaves the company holding a readable record of your family’s movements.

We set one rule before writing any of this: the server must never need a coordinate. If a feature seemed to require one, we could do that work on the phone, or we could leave the feature out.

Most of the decisions below follow from that rule. Why it matters is covered in our guide to private location sharing. This article is about how it’s done.

What happens when your phone shares its location

Sharing is off until you turn it on, and you turn it on one circle at a time. After that, each update goes through the same steps:

  1. The phone’s operating system gives the app a position.
  2. The app puts it in a small packet with its accuracy, your battery level, your speed and heading, and the time.
  3. The packet is encrypted with the circle’s key, using XChaCha20-Poly1305, a widely used modern cipher.
  4. The phone signs the request with a key that belongs to that circle alone, then sends it. No account sits behind that key, and no email address or phone number.
  5. Our server saves one row and passes the same sealed bytes to the circle’s members who are online.
  6. Their phones decrypt it and move your dot on the map.

This is what the saved row holds:

FieldWhat it holdsCan we read it?
StreamWhich member of which circle sent itYes
CounterA sequence number that stops old updates being replayedYes
TimesWhen it was sent, and how long the phone has reported staying in one spotYes
PayloadCoordinates, accuracy, battery, speed, headingNo

When we first built this, the acceptance test was blunt: send a real location, dump the whole database, and search the dump for the coordinates. It found nothing.

Where the key comes from

A circle’s key is created on the phone of the person who starts the circle, and our server never receives it in a form it can open. When someone joins, an existing member’s phone seals the key to the new member’s phone, and our server carries the sealed package across.

That handoff is the obvious place to attack, because whoever controls the server could try to slip in a key of their own. So while the new person waits to be let in, you both see a safety number, and you compare the two out loud before approving. If they match, your phones are talking to each other and not to us. The protection only works if you actually compare them.

Each circle has its own key and its own identity for you, so the key to your family circle opens nothing in your book club. If encryption is new to you, our plain-English explainer covers the basics.

The hard part: a phone in your pocket

Sharing is simple while the app is open. The useful case is a phone in a pocket with the app closed, so here’s how that works on iPhone. Android has its own rules for background work, so this part will be built differently there.

When iOS wakes the app in the background, a small piece of native code has to do the whole job alone: read the key, encrypt the update, sign it and post it. Nobody is there to type a passcode, so the key has to be readable without one once the phone has been unlocked after a restart. That’s a real trade-off, and we come back to it below.

Knowing when to wake is the other problem. iOS’s low-power “significant change” signal fires roughly every 500 metres, which is too coarse for a walk to school. So the app places an invisible circle with a radius of about 160 metres around you. When you leave it, iOS wakes the app, which takes one fresh reading, sends it, and places a new circle where you are now. The GPS isn’t held on between readings, which is what keeps the battery cost down. Updates are capped at one a minute per circle.

When you aren’t moving, the phone can mark an update as a repeat, and the server extends the last row instead of adding a new one. That stops a parked car from filling the database with identical rows. It also tells our server that your phone hasn’t moved, a small privacy cost we accepted. We can see that you stayed somewhere, though not where.

The features that had to move to the phone

Arrival alerts. Your saved places are stored in the circle’s encrypted metadata, so we hold no addresses. The phone’s operating system watches the boundaries, and when you cross one, your phone sends the alert. The details are in our guide to location alerts.

One thing to know here: each alert carries two readable fields, a random ID for the place and whether it was an arrival or a departure. They let our server honour a setting like “mute arrivals at this place” before it sends a push notification. We don’t know that an ID stands for a school, but we could see that a member arrives at the same numbered place at 8:40 every weekday. We decided per-place muting was worth that cost, and you should know we made that call.

History. Past locations sit on our server as sealed rows, so a phone that was offline can catch up. The phone downloads them, decrypts them and does the rest itself, including working out where someone stopped. Our server deletes them after 30 days, and your phone keeps its own copy.

The map. Map requests give you away. Each time you pan or zoom, an app asks for the pieces of map on screen, and a log of those requests says a lot about where your family is. So we host our own copy of OpenStreetMap data, prepared by Protomaps, in our own storage. Your phone reads it directly and keeps what it has fetched, and no map company is involved. The requests carry no identity, but our storage host, OVHcloud, can still see an IP address and which part of the map file it asked for.

Street names. This is the one we didn’t move. Turning coordinates into “Elm Street” takes a worldwide address database, and we don’t have one. On iPhone, when a member isn’t at a saved place, the app asks Apple’s geocoding service for the street name, so those coordinates go to Apple. They don’t pass through us. Searching for an address when you save a place goes to Apple the same way. On most Android phones the built-in equivalent is run by Google, so unless we build our own lookup, the same requests will go to Google there.

What we can still see

For location, our server can see:

  • That a circle exists, and how many people are in it.
  • Who in a circle is sharing, and when each update arrived. Bursts and gaps hint at when someone is moving or when their phone is off.
  • That a phone reported staying put, and for how long.
  • That a member arrived at or left a numbered place, and when.
  • IP addresses, as any internet service does. An IP address gives a rough idea of area.

Outside our servers, your position comes from the phone’s operating system, so Apple’s location services on iPhone, and Google’s on most Android phones, are part of the chain. The same two companies deliver push notifications. On iPhone their contents are encrypted, and we’ll hold Android to the same rule.

Where the protection is weaker than it sounds

Your circle can see you. Everyone in a circle holds its key and can see whatever you share with it. Encryption does nothing about that, so choose your circles with care, and see our thoughts on safety without surveillance.

Removing someone relies on our server. When a member is removed, our server stops sending them anything right away. By default the circle’s key doesn’t change, so they keep a key that would open older updates if they could get hold of them. That part is a “won’t” rather than a “can’t.”

One key does a lot of work. By default a circle uses one key for its location updates, rather than a new key for each one. Someone who obtained that key could read every sealed update still stored, which is one reason we delete them after 30 days.

Your keys are only as safe as your phone. Someone holding your unlocked phone can see what you can. On iPhone, keys can also sync through iCloud Keychain, so someone who gets into yours can reach them.

You’re taking our word for this. Sodal’s code isn’t public, and no outside firm has reviewed it yet. Until that changes, this article is our own description of our own work. Read it that way.

What this design costs

  • We can’t look anything up for you. If you ask us where a phone was last Tuesday, nobody here can tell you.
  • Some features don’t exist. Anything that needs a server to reason about where people are, such as suggestions based on places you visit, is off the table.
  • Recovery is limited. If you use iCloud Keychain, your circles come back on a new iPhone. Otherwise you need the circle’s 24-word phrase and someone in the circle to let you back in, and your old history doesn’t return.
  • We have no coordinates to hand over. If anyone asks us for your location, all we hold is the metadata listed above.

How to check any private location sharing app

You can put these questions to any app, including ours:

  1. If I forget my password, can you show me my location history? A yes usually means the company can read it.
  2. Does your server check when I reach a saved place? If so, it needs your location and your addresses.
  3. Who provides the map and the street names? Those requests can reveal places even when the updates themselves are encrypted.
  4. What can you still see? Look for a specific list. An app that delivers data across the internet can’t truthfully say “nothing.”
  5. Is sharing off until I turn it on, group by group?
  6. Has anyone outside the company checked? Public code or an independent audit both count. We don’t pass this one yet.

FAQ

Can Sodal see my location? No. Our server holds your coordinates only in encrypted form, and it has no key to open them. It can see who sent an update and when, whether a phone stayed put, and arrivals at numbered places, but not where any of that happened.

Does anyone outside my circle get my coordinates? The company behind your phone’s operating system can. On iPhone that’s Apple: street-name lookups send coordinates to its geocoding service, and your position comes from iOS in the first place. On most Android phones, Google will be in the same position. Sodal’s server doesn’t receive your coordinates unencrypted.

How long do you keep location data? Our server deletes sealed location updates 30 days after they were last updated. Your phone keeps its own copy.

Does location sharing work when the app is closed? Yes, on iPhone, if you allow “Always” location access. Updates come less often than with the app open: about one per 160 metres of travel, and never more than one a minute per circle.

Does all of this apply to Android? The Android app comes after the iPhone one. The encryption stays the same, and so does the rule that our server never needs a coordinate. Background sharing will work differently, and on most Android phones Google plays the part Apple plays here.

What would a hacker get from your server? Sealed updates and the metadata listed above. They wouldn’t get coordinates unless they also had the circle’s key.

Why does the server need to see anything at all? It has to know who to deliver to, and the metadata lets it mute notifications without opening anything. We could hide more of it, at the cost of features like muting a person or a place. We chose to keep those features and tell you what they cost.


The title of this article is accurate about where you are: we can’t see that. It isn’t a claim that we see nothing, and you’ve just read the list of what we do see. If another app tells you it sees nothing at all, ask it for its list.